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Jones v. Chicago HMO: The Illinois Supreme Court
Gives the HMO Industry a Rude Awakening
Maura F. Forde*
I. INTRODUCTION
Medical bills in the United States are growing at more than twice the
rate of inflation.' As a result, America's health care market has been
transformed.2 Out of necessity, Americans have become significantly
more dependent on health maintenance organizations ("HMOs"), 3 and
they are abandoning the traditional "fee-for-service" method of paying
for medical care in exchange for this less expensive alternative.4  With
* J.D. expected May 2001.
1. Robert J. Herrington, Herdrich v. Pegram: ERISA Fiduciary Liability and Physician
Incentives to Deny Care, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 715, 715 (2000).
2. Barbara A. Noah, The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort Liability Adapt to the
Realities of Cost Containment?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1219, 1219 (1997).
3. An HMO is a system of managed care in which subscribers pay a set fee in return for health
care benefits or medical care from physicians. Domenick C. DiCicco, Jr., HMO Liabiliofor the
Medical Negligence of Member Physicians, 43 VILL. L. REV. 499, 500 (1998). The aim of an
HMO is to provide basic quality health care at a low cost. Id. HMOs are a "hybrid of insurance,
cost control mechanisms, and medical delivery." Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organizations
and Patient Injury: Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REV. 419, 425 (1997). In the U.S., enrollment
in HMOs increased from 36.5 million in 1990 to 67.5 million in 1996. Kevin P. Quinn, S.J.,
Viewing Health Care as a Common Good: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 277, 281 n. 10 (2000). This figure is approximately one in four Americans. Id.
Approximately 2.5 million Illinois residents are HMO subscribers. David McKinney, HMO
Reforms Signed into Law: Patient's Rights Bill Will End Gag Clauses. CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 21,
1999, at 12, available at 1999 WL 6553330. This figure is one in every five Illinois residents.
Allison Kaplan, Group Says HMO Complaints Soaring, CHI. DAILY HERALD, May 12, 1999, at 9,
available at 1999 WL 17439451. In addition, the cost of HMOs is between ten and forty percent
less than traditional plans in which a patient pays for each individual service rendered.
Herrington, supra note 1, at 715. More than 75% of the physicians in the country see patients
through some form of managed care organization, including HMOs. Noah, supra note 2, at 1219.
4. Under this traditional "fee-for-service" system, a doctor is paid per visit, based on the
services provided. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Court Spares HMOs From U.S. Suits: Justices Say
Industry Would Be Put At Risk, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 2000, § 1, at 1, available at 2000 WL
3674082. In fact, in passing the Health Maintenance Act of 1973, Congress intended to "create
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their cost-saving financial incentives, HMOs have flourished in the
wake of an explosion in the cost of traditional medical care.
5
In spite of this boom in the HMO industry, HMOs and the quality of
medical care they provide have been under attack in recent years.6 A
controversy has emerged around the managed care industry, raising
questions about whether HMOs can keep medical costs down, while at
the same time ensuring that subscribers receive proper care.
7
Subscribers are growing more concerned that HMOs are putting "profits
ahead of medical-care decisions," 8 and the media has brought to the
public's attention "horror stories" of delay and denial of coverage.
9
This attention has propelled HMO reform into the political arena, as
advocates of a so-called "patients' bill of rights" bring their concerns to
the attention of judges and political leaders.' 0 In response to this
an alternative to the increasing cost of 'fee-for-service' doctors." Jonathan Turley, Court Strikes
Healthy Balance on HMOs, WALL. ST. J., June 13, 2000, at A26, available at 2000 WL 3032762.
5. Herrington, supra note 1, at 715. Today there are more than 600 HMOs nationwide. James
Bartimus & Christopher A. Wright, HMO Liability: From Corporate Negligence Claims for
Negligent Credentialing and Utilization Review to Bad Faith, 66 UMKC L. REV. 763, 763
(1998). Thirty years ago, there were less than forty. Id.
6. Lyle Denniston, Patients Challenge HMOs in Wave of Medical Lawsuits; At Least 20 Cases
Pending Amid Fears That Finances Determine Health Care, BALT. SUN, Feb. 20, 2000, at 3A,
available at 2000 WL 4859044. This attack on the managed care industry has been so aggressive
that it has been described as an echo of the recent attack on the tobacco industry. Id.
7. Greenburg, supra note 4, at 1; see also Jennifer S. Anderson, Comment, All True Histories
Contain Instruction: Why HMOs Cannot Avoid Malpratice Liability Through Independent
Contracting with Physicians, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 323, 323 (1998) (stating that "one of the
greatest controversies surrounding the explosive growth of the HMO industry has been the
distribution of tort liability between doctors and managed care entities").
8. Bruce Japsen, Family Doctors Side with HMOs, Not Medical Society, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 24,
1999, § 4, at 1, available at 1999 WL 2856415.
9. William Neikirk, 'Patients' Bill of Rights' Sails Through the House but Legislation Faces a
Long Road Before Implementation, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 8, 1999, § 1, at 1, available at 1999 WL
2919811. For example, in Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc., the plaintiff's doctor
recommended she have an MRI and a CT scan performed on her skull. Petrovich v. Share Health
Plan of Ill., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756, 761 (I11. 1999). The HMO would not cover these tests,
however, and thus, they were never performed. Six months later, she was diagnosed with cancer,
and ultimately, she died. Id; see also infra notes 56-89 and accompanying text (discussing
Petrovich and its holding).
In another example of an HMO's denial or delay in appropriate care, a nine-year-old boy had
experienced fainting spells for a couple of years. His HMO-provided physician took his
temperature, and advised the boy to drink more Gatorade and refrain from overexertion. Two
months later, the boy died from an enlarged heart while playing basketball outside his home.
Milo Geyelin, Health Care: Courts Pierce HMOs' Shield Against Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Apr.
30, 1999, at BI, available at 1999 WL 5450772.
In some cases, even the patient's own doctor objects to the HMO's delay or denial of coverage.
Philip H. Corboy, Commentary, Holding Managed Care Accountable, CHI. TRIB., July 22, 1999,
§ I, at 22, available at 1999 WL 2895240.
10. Douglas Holt, Patients Can Sue Their HMO: State Justices OK Malpractice Action, CHI.
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controversy, legislatures and courts across the country have attempted to
expand this "patients' bill of rights" and hold HMOs accountable for the
health care they provide to their subscribers." Advocates of reform
argue that expanding patients' rights will force HMOs to deliver more
reliable care. 12 Conversely, the managed care industry fervently lobbies
against any action, arguing that reform will lead to both frivolous
lawsuits and an increase in the costs of health care. 13 Nevertheless, a
number of states have successfully passed various reform bills
expanding HMO liability. 14 The Illinois General Assembly considered
several bills on managed care reform and recently enacted a "patients'
bill of rights" that includes some, but not all, of the reforms urged by
advocates of patients' rights. 15 Absent from the Illinois legislation was
a provision giving patients the right to sue their HMOs under a theory of
tort liability, a controversial issue that has been of particular concern for
patients' rights advocates.16
TRIB., Oct. 1, 1999, § 1, at 1, available at 1999 WL 2917409. This "patients' bill of rights" refers
to legislation designed to give HMO patient-subscribers more options and "protect consumers
from abuses by HMOs and make health insurance more affordable for those who don't have
coverage." Editorial, Finding Balance on Patients' Rights, CHI. TRIB., June 5, 2000, § 1, at 12,
available at 2000 WL 3672054. Advocates of the "patients' bill of rights" include doctors,
unions, and groups representing patients, consumers veterans and seniors. Corboy, supra note 9,
at 22.
11. Jane Bryant Quinn, Insurance Malpractice: HMOs and Other Managed-Care Plans May
Be Held Accountable for Medical Decisions, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 11, 1997, § 1, at 9, available at
1997 WL 3587473. For example, in 1996, 1000 pieces of legislation, attempting to regulate
HMOs, were introduced in state legislatures across the country. Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency
of Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and
Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 & n.3 (1999) (quoting Thomas Bodenheimer, The
HMO Backlash-Righteous or Reactionary?, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1601, 1601 (1996)).
12. Corboy, supra note 9, at 22.
13. See Steve Silverman, Woman Suing HMO over Breast Surgery, PANTAGRAPH
(Bloomington, 11.), Apr. 14, 2000, at A3, available at 2000 WL 7790237.
14. For example, in 1995 alone, more than twenty state legislatures considered bills aimed at
managed care organizations, such as HMOs. Bruce D. Platt & Lisa D. Stream, Dispelling the
Negative Myths of Managed Care: An Analysis of Anti-Managed Care Legislation and the
Quality of Care Provided by Health Maintenance Organizations, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 489,
493 (1995) (discussing legislative proposals for managed care reform in the Florida state
legislature). In 1996, thirty-five states passed some type of "patient-friendly legislation." Quinn,
supra note 3, at 282 n.l 1. In May 1997, Texas was the first state to give HMO subscribers the
right to sue their HMO for medical malpractice. S.B. 386, 75th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Tex. 1997); see
also Quinn, supra note 11, at 9. Missouri also enacted a bill giving patients the right to sue their
HMOs in 1997. H.B. 335, 89th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997). California, Arizona, Georgia,
Louisiana, Maine, Oklahoma, and Washington also recently enacted laws that allow subscribers
to sue their HMOs. Charles Stile, Patients Right to Sue Gains Two Key Backers, THE RECORD
(Northern N.J.), Aug. 30, 2000, at A l, available at 2000 WL 15829081.
15. Infra Part II.B (discussing the Illinois General Assembly's passage of the Patients' Bill of
Rights).
16. Infra Part lI.B (discussing the enactment of the Illinois Patients' Bill of Rights).
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Despite this omission by the General Assembly, the Illinois Supreme
Court recently filled the void and expanded tort liability in the arena of
health law, substantially affecting HMOs. 17 In Petrovich v. Share
Health Plan of Illinois, Inc., 18 the court granted subscribers the right to
sue their HMOs for medical malpractice under a theory of vicarious
liability.' 9 Soon after Petrovich, the Illinois Supreme Court went even
further in Jones v. Chicago HMO,20 a landmark ruling that grants
patient subscribers the right to sue their HMOs on a theory of
institutional negligence. 21 As a result of Jones, an HMO subscriber in
Illinois can now directly sue the HMO for any corporate negligence or
carelessness resulting in the subscriber's injury.22  Until Jones, HMOs
relied on "presumed legal protections" against negligence suits. Thus,
Jones is expected to have a significant effect on the way HMOs do
business.23
This Note will examine the gradual expansion of tort liability for
HMOs in Illinois, leading up to the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling in
Jones.24  This Note will then trace the Illinois Supreme Court's
treatment of tort liability in the health care arena and discuss recent
legislation in this area. 25  Next, this Note will review the decisions of
the lower courts and the Illinois Supreme Court in Jones.26 This Note
will then analyze the Jones court's far-reaching decision and the
necessity for such an outcome in light of the recent changes in health
care, especially the expanding role of HMOs. 27 Finally, this Note will
17. Daniel P. Wurl, HMO Liability and the Fiduciary Duty of Physicians, TORT TRENDS
(Illinois State Bar Association, Springfield, Ill.), May 2000, at 1.
18. Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756 (I1. 1999).
19. Id. Prior to this holding, injured patients could sue only the "direct providers of health
care (doctors, hospitals, etc.)." Editorial, The Dam Bursts on HMO Lawsuits, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5,
1999, § 1, at 14, available at 1999 WL 2918755 [hereinafter Dam Bursts]. Vicarious liability
claims do not hold HMOs accountable for medical decisions of the HMO, but rather for the
negligence of their employees or agents. Joshua M. Spielberg, Overcoming ERISA, TRIAL, May
2000, at 54.
20. Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119 (111. 2000) [hereinafter Jones II].
21. Institutional negligence involves an administrative or managerial action by an HMO and
does not involve the professional conduct of the physician. Id. at 1128.
22. Bruce Japsen, HMO Liability Increases: Illinois Justices Allow Direct Lawsuits by
Patients, CHI. TRIB., May 19, 2000, § 1, at 1, available at 2000 WL 3667125.
23. Id.
24. Infra Parts II and IIH (discussing the passage of the Illinois Patients' Bill of Rights and the
Jones 11 decision).
25. Infra Part II (examining the development of Illinois law on patients' rights).
26. Infra Part III (explaining the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Jones II, holding
that an HMO can be liable for institutional negligence).
27. Infra Part IV (asserting that the Illinois Supreme Court was correct in its Jones 11 holding
that HMOs are subject to tort liability for institutional negligence).
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explore the future impact of this decision on HMOs and the managed
care industry, predicting a much-needed increase in HMO
accountability and a vast improvement in the quality of health care.
28
II. BACKGROUND
A. Illinois Courts on Health Care Reform and HMO Liability
Traditionally, health care providers such as hospitals and HMOs have
enjoyed special immunity from liability for the medical care they
provide to their subscribers. 29  Until recently, only the direct providers
of medical care, like doctors, could be held liable. 30  Despite resistance
from institutional health care providers, Illinois courts have gradually
chipped away at this traditional legal immunity.31 The emergence of
liability against HMOs mirrors the emergence of liability against
hospitals. 32 The first decision affecting hospital liability was the 1965
landmark decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Darling v.
Charleston Community Memorial Hospital.33  This decision was the
birth of tort liability for health care providers, other than doctors, in
Illinois.34  In 1999, the Illinois Supreme Court opened the door to
liability against HMOs in Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois,
Inc.35  An examination of Darling and Petrovich reveal the gradual
movement in Illinois courts toward holding health care providers
accountable for their actions. 36
28. Infra Part V (analyzing the impact of this change in patients' rights and the effect on the
managed care industry).
29. Dam Bursts, supra note 19, at 14.
30. Id. The doctrine of charitable immunity protected hospitals from liability. See Anderson,
supra note 7, at 330. Under charitable immunity, non-profit organizations, including not-for-
profit hospitals, escaped liability for the negligent acts of their employees. Id. For HMOs,
immunity from liability stemmed from the federal ERISA statute, which governs employee
benefits. Editorial, Sue Your HMO? Bad Idea, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 1998, § 1, at 20, available at
1998 WL 2866350. Under ERISA, employees can only sue their insurance plans in federal court
and can only recover the value of the service that was unfairly denied. Id.
31. Anderson, supra note 7, at 329.
32. Id. (discussing the similarities between HMOs and hospitals in the area of tort liability and
arguing that the traditional immunity both enjoyed was based on oversight or mistake). Both
entities were immune from all tort liability and, in recent years, both have tried to maintain this
immunity and avoid liability by resorting to independent contracting with physicians. Id. at 330;
see also Bruce Japsen, Ruling Against HMOs Looks Familiar, CHI. TRIB., May 23, 2000, § 4, at
5, available at 2000 WL 3668286 (comparing HMO liability in Jones II to hospital liability in
Darling).
33. Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (I1. 1965).
34. Anderson, supra note 7, at 328.
35. Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756 (I1. 1999).
36. See infra Parts II.A.1 (discussing the Darling decision, in which the Illinois Supreme
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1. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital
The doctrine of corporate, or institutional, negligence was introduced
to the health care industry in Darling v. Charleston Community
Memorial Hospital.37 In Darling, the plaintiff, Dorrence Darling II,
injured his leg in a football game and was taken to the emergency room
of the defendant hospital where he was treated by the emergency room
doctor.38 The doctor, with the assistance of other hospital personnel,
placed Mr. Darling's leg in a plaster cast.39  Not long after, Mr.
Darling's toes, which protruded from the cast, turned a dark color and
became swollen, cold, insensitive, and extremely painful.40 Three days
after the application of the cast, the doctor split the sides of the cast.41
Under the cast, the doctor observed blood and a horrific stench.42  Mr.
Darling was transferred to another hospital where a second doctor
examined his leg.43 This doctor found dead tissue, which he believed
resulted from interference with the circulation of the blood in the limb
caused by swelling or hemorrhaging of Mr. Darling's leg.44 Ultimately,
the doctor amputated Mr. Darling's leg eight inches below the knee. 45
Court held for the first time that a hospital could be subject to tort liability on the theory of
institutional negligence), II.A.2 (explaining the Petrovich decision, in which the Illinois Supreme
Court held that an HMO can be vicariously liable for negligence of physicians acting as
independent contractors, under agency law).
37. Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (III. 1965). In the area of
health care, "[tihe theory of corporate negligence holds that the health care organization ... has a
duty to its patients to ensure the 'competency of its medical staff and the quality of medical care
provided through prudent selection, review and continuing evaluation of the physicians that are
granted staff privileges."' Bartimus & Wright, supra note 5, at 764 (quoting Rule v. Lutheran
Hosps. Soc'y of Am., 835 F.2d 1250, 1253 (8th Cir. 1987)). This was the first time any court in
the nation imposed corporate negligence against a hospital. Id. at 765. Prior to the court's
decision in Darling, hospitals faced liability only based on ordinary negligence, the failure to use
reasonable care in the selection of staff, or on a theory of vicarious liability for the conduct of
employee or agent medical professionals. Advincula v. United Blood Serv., 678 N.E.2d 1009,
1023 (I11. 1997) (discussing a number of cases that illustrate these three bases of liability from
decisions prior to the Illinois Supreme Court's landmark holding in Darling).
Since the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Darling, the doctrine of corporate negligence has
been applied to hospitals in the courts of several states. Bartimus & Wright, supra note 5, at 765.
38. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 255. The defendant is a licensed and accredited hospital. Id. at
256.
39. Id. at 255.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. A bystander described this stench as the worst he had smelled since World War II. Id.
43. Id. at 256.
44. Id. An orthopedic surgeon at a different hospital than that of the defendant made this
diagnosis. Id.
45. Id. Prior to the amputation, Mr. Darling had several operations in a futile effort to save the
leg. Id.
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Mr. Darling brought an action against the hospital to recover
damages for the negligent medical and hospital treatment that resulted
in the amputation of his right leg.46 Mr. Darling alleged that the
hospital, as an entity, was negligent for failure to adequately supervise
its medical staff and for failure to follow up on his injuries, particularly
after complications developed.47 The defendant hospital argued that
only an individual professional, and not a corporation, could be held
liable for the health care provided to a patient.48  Therefore, the
defendant argued, the hospital, as an entity, was immune from liability
for the negligence of its medical staff.
49
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the defendant's assertions and
established corporate negligence as a recognized theory of liability
against hospitals. 50 The court stressed the expanding role of a hospital
in providing health care to its patients, noting that hospitals do much
more than merely furnish facilities for treatment.51 Instead, the court
stated that hospitals regularly employ not only physicians and interns,
but also administrative and manual workers, all of whom provide
services on behalf of the hospital to patients who rely on the hospital, as
46. Id. at 255. Because Mr. Darling was a minor, the action was actually brought by his
father. Id.
47. Id. at 256. The court summarized Mr. Darling's arguments on the issue of institutional
negligence:
Plaintiff contends also that in a case which developed as this one did, it was the duty of
the nurses to watch the protruding toes constantly for changes of color, temperature
and movement, and to check circulation every ten to twenty minutes, whereas the proof
showed that these things were done only a few times a day. Plaintiff argues that it was
the duty of the hospital staff to see that these procedures were followed, and that either
the nurses were derelict in failing to report developments in the case to the hospital
administrator, he was derelict in bringing them to the attention of the medical staff, or
the staff was negligent in failing to take action.
Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. The court quoted the defendant hospital's brief:
It is a fundamental rule of law that only an individual properly educated and licensed,
and not a corporation, may practice medicine. Accordingly, a hospital is powerless
under the law to forbid or command any act by a physician or surgeon in the practice
of his profession.... The extent of the duty of a hospital with respect to actual medical
care of a professional nature such as is furnished by a physician is to use reasonable
care in selecting medical doctors. When such care in the selection of the staff is
accomplished, and nothing indicates that a physician so selected is incompetent or that
such incompetence should have been discovered, more cannot be expected from the
hospital administration.
Id.
50. Id. at 257.
51. Id.
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a whole, for their health care.52 Because hospitals assume this active
role in providing health care, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized an
institutional or corporate duty to supervise the treatment that is provided
to its patients. 53  This duty does not pertain to medical care, but is
administrative or managerial in nature, ensuring that hospital
supervision results in adequate patient care.54  In accordance with this
newly recognized duty, the Darling court applied liability based on a
theory of corporate or institutional negligence to hospitals for the first
time.55
2. Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc.
Although Darling diminished the immunity traditionally granted to
health care providers in the case of hospitals, HMOs continued to enjoy
freedom from liability.56 In 1992, an Illinois appellate court considered
Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc. and, for the first time, addressed the
theories of liability that a subscriber could assert against an HMO.57 In
Raglin, the court maintained its reluctance to expand liability by
refusing to hold an HMO liable for the medical malpractice of a
physician under a theory of vicarious liability. 58
52. Id. The court continued, "Ic]ertainly, the person who avails himself of 'hospital facilities'
expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other employees will act
on their own responsibility." Id. (quoting Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (1957)).
53. Id. The Darling court did not distinguish between a situation where the doctors are
salaried employees of the hospital and one where the doctors are merely contractors. Subsequent
cases relying on Darling, however, have made this distinction. For example, in Johnson v. St.
Bernard Hospital, an Illinois Appellate Court stated, "although a hospital may be liable for the
injuries to a patient caused by the negligence of its agents or employees, traditionally, it has been
held that a hospital is not liable for acts of one who renders medical care as an independent agent
outside the control of the hospital." Johnson v. St. Bernard Hosp., 399 N.E. 2d 198, 203 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1979).
54. Advincula v. United Blood Services, 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1023 (1997) (citing Pedroza v.
Bryant, 677 P.2d 166 (Wa. 1984)). Corporate negligence is "not based on medical expertise, but
administrative expertise to enforce rules and regulations adopted to ensure a smoothly run
hospital and adequate medical care." Id.
55. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
56. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 338.
57. Mary Beth Denefe & Robert W. Brunner, Managed Care Liability Under Illinois Law, 86
ILL. B.J. 536, 542 (1998).
58. Raglin v. HMO Ill., Inc., 595 N.E.2d 153 (I11. App. Ct. 1992), overruled by Petrovich v.
Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756 (III. 1999). In Raglin, the plaintiff, Gwendolyn
Raglin, was a subscriber to the defendant HMO. Id. at 154. Ms. Raglin became pregnant and
visited a doctor who was an independent contractor with the defendant HMO. Id. at 154 n.1.
This doctor was aware that Ms. Raglin's medical history "presented a strong likelihood that
Raglin could develop diabetes during pregnancy, which, in turn, could lead to a larger than
normal birth size baby." Id. at 155. However, the doctors failed to perform tests to monitor her
blood sugar. Id. The delivery of her baby was "complicated by a condition known as shoulder
2001] Jones v. Chicago HMO
The tables turned for HMOs, however, in 1999 when the Illinois
Supreme Court decided Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc.59
The Petrovich court overturned Raglin and ruled that an HMO can be
held vicariously liable under a theory of agency law for the negligence
of physicians who act as independent contractors. 60  For the first time,
the Illinois Supreme Court granted HMO subscribers a right to sue; this
was a radical decision considering that the Illinois General Assembly
debated the issue for almost four years without reaching an agreement.
61
Petrovich provided that medical malpractice liability, which is generally
directed at doctors, now could be aimed at "the deep pockets of
HMOs." 62
The plaintiff in Petrovich, Ms. Petrovich, was an enrollee of Share
HMO.63 Ms. Petrovich visited Dr. Kowalski, a primary care physician
who contracted with Share. 64  Ms. Petrovich complained to Dr.
dystocia," which means that "because of its size, the baby's shoulders become lodged in the birth
canal and caused delivery to be arrested." Id. The doctors then had to apply pressure to Ms.
Raglin's abdomen and use forceps to deliver the baby. Id. As a result, the baby suffered serious
permanent injuries, including paralysis. Id.
Ms. Raglin filed a medical malpractice action against the HMO for the alleged negligent
medical care she received. Id. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the HMO, holding that an HMO cannot be held vicariously liable for the
negligence of doctors under contract with them because respondeat superior does not apply in the
case of independent contractors. Id. at 158. Despite this ruling the court did state, in dicta, that,
HMOs can be held liable for medical malpractice based on one or more theories.
including vicarious liability on the basis of respondeat superior or ostensible agency;
corporate negligence based upon negligent selection and control of physicians;
corporate negligence based upon the corporation's independent acts of negligence,
such as the management of an utilization control system; and breach of contract or
breach of warranty.
Denefe & Brunner, supra note 57, at 542.
59. Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. 1999).
60. Id. at 769. The Petrovich decision was deemed a "victory" by patient advocates, and a
"blow" by the health care industry. See Holt, supra note 10, at I. This victory for patients' rights
advocates came after they had failed to win legislative approval of the right to sue over four
years.
61. See Wurl, supra note 17, at 1: see also supra Part II.B (discussing attempts by the Illinois
General Assembly to pass Managed Care Reform legislation.)
62. Bruce Japsen and Michelle Brutlag, Rights-and Expense-to Rise Under HMO Law, CHI.
TRIB., May 28, 1999, § 1, at 1, available at 1999 WL 2877872.
63. Petrovich, 719 N.E.2d at 760. Inga Petrovich was the plaintiff who originally filed this
action. Id. However, because she died during the pendency of the appeal, her husband, William
Petrovich, took her place as appellee, on behalf of her estate. Id. at 760.
64. Id. at 761. Share is organized as an independent practice association ("IPA") model
HMO, meaning it contracts with physicians, rather than employing them. Id. at 762. In addition,
"Share does not ... own, operate, maintain, or supervise the offices [of the physicians]. Rather,
Share contracts with independent medical groups and physicians that have the facilities,
equipment and professional skills necessary to render medical care." Id.
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Kowalski of persistent pain on the right side of her mouth and around
her tongue and throat.65  Dr. Kowalski referred Ms. Petrovich to Dr.
Friedman, also a contract physician with Share. 66  Dr. Friedman
suggested that Ms. Petrovich undergo an MRI or a CT scan of her
skull.67 Ms. Petrovich reported these suggestions to Dr. Kowalski, who
informed Ms. Petrovich that Share did not allow these tests. 68 The tests
were never performed.69
Approximately six months later, Ms. Petrovich went back to Dr.
Kowalski, complaining again of pain in her mouth, and Dr. Kowalski
again referred her to Dr. Freidman. 70  This time, Dr. Friedman
performed multiple biopsies that revealed that Ms. Petrovich had
cancerous cells at the base of her tongue and the surrounding tissues of
her pharynx. 71 Parts of her tongue, palate, pharynx, and jawbone were
removed, and she underwent radiation treatment and rehabilitation. 72
Ms. Petrovich brought a medical malpractice action against Share,
alleging that both Dr. Kowalski and Dr. Freidman were negligent in
failing to diagnose her cancer in a timely manner, and that Share was
vicariously liable for the negligence of the doctors because the doctors
were both agents of Share. 73 Defendant Share argued that it could not
be held liable for the negligence of Dr. Kowalski or Dr. Friedman
because they were independent contractors at the time they treated the
plaintiff, and not Share's agents. 74 The circuit court granted summary
judgment in favor of Share, holding that an HMO cannot be held
vicariously liable for the negligence of its independent contractor
65. Id. at 761. Ms. Petrovich's employer was enrolled in the defendant HMO, Share, which
only pays benefits for health care provided by one of its contracting physicians. See Denefe &
Brunner, supra note 57, at 540. Share's physicians provide its members with overall care and
issue referrals when necessary. Petrovich, 719 N.E.2d at 761. Share has approximately 500
primary care physicians in the service area it covers. Id. Share allows its members to select from
a list of participating physicians. Id. Inga Petrovich selected Dr. Kowalski as her primary care
physician. Id.
66. Petrovich. 719 N.E.2d at 761.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. Dr. Kowalski did subsequently perform an MRI on Ms. Petrovich, but this test did not
cover the area of her skull that Dr. Freidman had directed. Id. Ms. Petrovich did not discuss the
tests with anyone at Share because she was not aware of Share's grievance policy. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. Ms. Petrovich also brought a suit against Dr. Kowalski. Id. Dr. Freidman was not
named as a defendant. Id.
74. Id. at 761-62.
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physicians. 75  The appellate court reversed the lower court's decision
and held, instead, that an HMO can be liable for medical malpractice
under the theory of apparent agency. 76  The court also held that Ms.
Petrovich had raised sufficient issues of fact to preclude summary
judgment.77  Share petitioned the Illinois Supreme Court for leave to
appeal.78 The Illinois Supreme Court granted review and affirmed.79
In affirming the decision of the appellate court, the Illinois Supreme
Court ruled that HMOs can be liable for medical malpractice. 80  In so
doing, the court stated that there was no reason to grant HMOs special
legal protections and, because of the risks involved in health care
delivery, HMOs should be held accountable for their actions in order to
ensure quality medical care.81 The court stated that every organization
is subject to tort liability for any injury caused by its actions and the
mere fact that HMOs were designed to contain costs did not exempt
them from liability. 82  Rather, the court reasoned that HMO
accountability is a necessary safeguard to counterbalance the profit
making motives inherent in managed care organizations and will help
ensure that subscribers receive quality health care.8 3  Therefore, the
75. Id. at 760. The circuit court relied on a provision in the contract between Share and its
subscribers expressly stating: "The relationship between a Share Plan Provider and any Member
is that of provider and patient. The Share Plan Physician is solely responsible for the medical
services provided to any Member." Id. at 763. In addition, the Share benefits contract explained
that Share physicians are independent contractors and that Share plan providers "are not agents or
employees of Share." Id. at 762. The circuit court simply held that, based on the structure and
organization of Share, there was no genuine issue of material fact that an agency relationship
existed. Id. The supreme court noted, however, that "unlike the master agreements and benefits
contract ... the member handbook which plaintiff received does not contain any provision that
identifies Share physicians as independent contractors." Id.
76. Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 696 N.E.2d 356 (111. App. Ct. 1998). The
appellate court stated: "HMOs should not be allowed to hold themselves out as total providers of
health care and then seek to avoid liability based on a disclaimer [that physicians were
independent contractors] buried in a contract." Id. at 365.
77. The First District Appellate Court pointed to evidence that may tend to show some doctors
may have tailored their medical decisions in light of the compensation arrangements and cost-
containment concerns. See Denefe & Brunner, supra note 57, at 542. Therefore, the court held
that a "genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Share exerted a sufficient amount of
control over its participating physicians such that an agency relationship could be inferred." Id.
78. Petrovich, 719 N.E.2d at 760.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 766. The supreme court did not decide the merits of the case, only that a genuine
issue of material fact existed. See Holt, supra note 10, at 1.
81. Petrovich, 719 N.E.2d at 764.
82. Id. The court stated, "[tihe principle that organizations are accountable for their tortious
actions and those of their agents is fundamental to our justice system." Id. Furthermore, the cost-
containment role of HMOs grants them no special protection from liability. Id.
83. Id. The court stated, "[t]o the extent that HMOs are profit making entities, accountability
is also needed to counterbalance the inherent drive to achieve a large and ever increasing profit
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court held that theories of tort liability should apply to HMOs in the
same way they apply to other entities.
84
Applying this reasoning to the facts of the case, the Illinois Supreme
Court explained that although vicarious liability generally does not
apply to the acts of an independent contractor, vicarious liability may
nevertheless be imposed if an agency relationship is established under
the doctrine of apparent authority. 85  The court relied on an earlier
Illinois case, Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital,86 which imposed
vicarious liability on hospitals for the medical malpractice of their
independent contractor physicians, and reasoned that the same theory of
tort liability should apply in the case of HMOs. 87 Examining the facts
set forth by Ms. Petrovich, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether, under the
doctrine of apparent authority, vicarious liability could apply to Share. 88
Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the appellate court.89
B. Proposed Illinois Legislation on Health Care Reform and HMO
Liability
With the transformation of the health care market in the U.S., the
issue of managed care reform has troubled Congress and state
legislatures across the country. 90 For nearly four years, the Illinois
margin." Id.
84. Id. The court also recognized a pattern of HMO liability emerging across the nation. The
court said, "[tihe national trend of courts is to hold HMOs accountable for medical malpractice
under a variety of legal theories, including vicarious liability on the basis of apparent authority,
vicarious liability on the basis of respondeat superior, direct corporate negligence, breach of
contract and breach of warranty." Id.
85. Id. at 765.
86. Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 622 N.E.2d 788 (I11. 1993).
87. Petrovich, 719 N.E.2d at 765. In Gilbert, the Illinois Supreme Court held that "unless the
patient knows or should have known that the physician providing treatment is an independent
contractor, vicarious liability can attach to a hospital for the medical malpractice of its physicians
under the apparent authority doctrine." Id. (citing Gilbert, 622 N.E.2d 795). The Gilbert decision
established that two requisite elements for proving apparent agency are a "holding out" by a
hospital and "justifiable reliance" by the plaintiff. Id. (quoting Gilbert, 622 N.E.2d at 796).
88. Id. at 769. The court also considered whether the doctrine of implied authority could
apply, and it reached the same result. Id. at 770. The court stated that, "the implied authority
doctrine may be used against an HMO to negate a physician's status as an independent
contractor," and that, "[a]n implied agency exists where the facts and circumstances show that an
HMO exerted such sufficient control over a participating physician so as to negate that
physician's status as an independent contractor, at least with respect to third parties." Id. at 772.
89. Id. at 775.
90. See Japsen, supra note 22, at I. United States House Democratic Leader, Richard
Gephardt, stated that the quality of managed care is "one of the kitchen-table issues that people
care about." William Neikirk, GOP Suffers Self-Inflicted Wounds over Health Care Wider
Coverage, HMOs Debated, CHI. TRIB., June 7, 1998, § 1, at 3, available at 1998 WL 2864263.
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General Assembly has struggled with attempts to craft legislation
regulating HMOs and providing HMO subscribers with more rights and
a higher quality of health care. 91 Through the passage of a "Patients'
Bill of Rights," the issue of managed care reform has been hotly
debated on the floors of both houses, but legislators have fervently
disagreed over which rights should be included.92
For the most part, the Illinois General Assembly has avoided the
issue of institutional negligence, focusing instead on the subscriber's
right to sue HMOs for malpractice. 93 In both 1998 and 1999, the House
Health Care Availability and Access Committee drafted a bill to amend
the Health Maintenance Organization Act. 94  Each of these bills
included a provision that would affirmatively provide HMO subscribers
the right to sue their HMO for medical malpractice. 95  This "right to
sue" was the most aggressive health care proposal in the General
Assembly in recent years. 96  However, a like provision was excluded
from Senate proposals and was the source of disagreement between the
two houses. 97  As a result, HMO reform efforts ended in deadlock.98
The House Committee proposals passed in the Democratic-controlled
91. Clair M. Callan, Commentary, Health Rights, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 1999, § 1, at 12,
available at 1999 WL 2885638.
92. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 9 (describing the House and Senate as "miles apart on what an
HMO bill should include").
93. See Dori Meinert, Supreme Court Rejects Lawsuit Against HMO, ST. J. V. REG., June 13,
2000, at 1, available at http://www.sj-r.com/news/0010106113Id.htm.
94. See Adriana Colindres, Election Could Shape Health-Care Reforms, ST. J. REG., Nov. 2,
1998, at I, available at 1998 WL 21332190; see also Christi Parsons & Ray Long, Patient's Bill
of Rights in Trouble: Passage by Legislature Doubted by Session End, CHI. TRIB., May 13, 1998,
§ 1, at 9, available at 1998 WL 285561 I.
95. See Michelle Brutlag, House Bill Would Allow Patients To Sue HMOs: Measure Targets
Medical Malpractice, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 25, 1999, § 1, at 11, available at 1999 WL 2856888. This
is the same "right to sue" that the Illinois Supreme Court ultimately granted to HMO subscribers
in Petrovich. Holt, supra note 10, at 1. The House bill also included a grievance procedure under
which subscribers could appeal decisions made by their HMO. Parsons & Long, supra note 94. at
9.
96. See Brutlag, supra note 95, at 11. The bill was sponsored by Democratic Representative
Mary Flowers. Id.
97. See Adiana Colindres, House Passes HMO Reform Plan/Senate Vote Likely Today, ST. J.
REG., May 27, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 16229298. In an attempt to help pass a bill,
negotiators began drafting legislation that was a "hybrid" of proposals from the two houses. Id.
However, this compromise legislation did not include the provision of the House version that
would allow subscribers to sue their HMOs. Id.
98. Id. at 9. At the federal level, a similar debate persists, preventing Congress from reaching
an agreement on a "patients' bill of rights." In 1999, the House passed a managed care reform
bill that would give patients numerous rights, including the right to sue heath insurance plans.
See Quinn, supra note 3, at 282 n.12 (quoting Robert Pear, House Passes Bill to Expand Rights
on Medical Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at A 15). However, the Senate would not support this
provision. Id.
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House both years, over objections by many Republican
representatives. 99 The Senate, however, refused to agree to the right to
sue provision and, consequently, both bills failed.' ° The Illinois
General Assembly placed the issue of corporate negligence in the
background of the managed care reform debate.
10 1
After much compromise, the General Assembly finally passed a
"Patients' Bill of Rights" in August 1999.102 This new law forbids gag
rules that prevent doctors from informing patients of treatment options,
gives patients greater access to specialists, and creates new ways for
patients to appeal medical decisions. 10 3 Although this bill will certainly
boost the quality of health care that HMO subscribers receive, it does
not go so far as to provide subscribers the right to sue their HMO.'
0 4
Whereas the enactment of some legislation relieved patients' rights
advocates, because the legislature omitted a patient's right to sue from
the bill, many considered the bill a defeat.
10 5
III. DIscuSSION
A. Jones v. Chicago HMO: The Facts
The Illinois Supreme Court went much further than the General
Assembly in May 2000 when it issued a landmark ruling in favor of
patients' rights in Jones v. Chicago HMO.10 6 Chicago HMO, organized
pursuant to the Illinois Health Maintenance Organization Act,
107
99. Brutlag, supra note 95, at 11. Many Republican legislators objected to this provision,
arguing that it is "not good public policy to legislate the fight to sue," in light of the overburdened
court system. Id. (quoting Republican Representative James Durkin).
100. Holt, supra note 10, at 1.
101. Meinert, supra note 93, at I (discussing legislation affecting HMO liability).
102. See McKinney, supra note 3, at 12. The enacted bill is the Managed Care Reform and
Patient Rights Act, 1999 11. Laws 91-0617 (S.B. 0251). This legislation will only apply to about
forty percent of the HMO subscribers in Illinois because ERISA exempts the health insurance
plans of large employers from state regulation. See Brutlag, supra note 95, at 11. This bill
became effective on January 1, 2000. See McKinney, supra note 3, at 12.
103. 1999 Ill. Laws 91-0617 (S.B. 0251); see also Holt, supra note 10, at 1.
104. Holt, supra note 10, at 1.
105. Matt Adrian, HMO Reform, State Budget Measures Still Awaiting Vote, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
May 23, 1999, at 3, available at 1999 WL 6540356 (stating that health care reform advocates
were angry that the legislation did not include provisions allowing patients to sue). Despite this
defeat in the Illinois General Assembly, these patients' rights advocates were ultimately
victorious when the Illinois Supreme Court granted patients the right to sue HMOs for medical
malpractice in Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc. Holt, supra note 10, at I.
106. Jones 11, 730 N.E.2d 1119 (111. 2000).
107. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/1-2(9) (1994). The Illinois Health Maintenance
Organization Act defines an HMO as "any organization formed under the laws of this or another
state to provide or arrange for one or more health care plans under a system which causes any part
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provides health care to its subscribers by contracting with independent
medical groups or physicians. 10 8  Chicago HMO contracted with the
Illinois Department of Public Aid and agreed to provide health care
services to Medicaid recipients. 1°9 Sheila Jones, a Medicaid recipient,
subscribed to Chicago HMO,' 10 and Dr. Jordan, a contract physician of
Chicago HMO, became the Jones' primary care physician."' l  In
addition to Ms. Jones and her family, over 4,500 other Chicago HMO
patients used Dr. Jordan as their primary care physician.' 12
On January 18, 1991, Ms. Jones' three-month old baby, Shawndale,
became ill. Ms. Jones immediately called Dr. Jordan's office, pursuant
to Chicago HMO protocol. 13 Because Dr. Jordan was unavailable, Ms.
Jones informed Dr. Jordan's assistant of Shawndale's symptoms.114
The assistant advised her to give Shawndale castor oil.115  Dr. Jordan
returned her call later in the evening and gave Ms. Jones the same
of the risk of health care delivery to be borne by the organization or its providers." Id.
108. Wurl, supra note 17, at 5. Chicago HMO contracts with physicians, rather than directly
employing its own physicians. Id. Chicago HMO is a for-profit corporation. See Jones II, 730
N.E.2d at 1124. It is organized as an independent practice association ("IPA") model HMO. Id.
An IPA contracts with its physicians for the providing of health care, whereas a "staff model"
HMO provides health care through employing its own salaried physicians. Raglin v. HMO Ill.,
Inc., 595 N.E.2d 153. 154 n.1 (III. 1992), overruled by Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc.,
719 N.E.2d 756 (111. 1999). Under a staff model, because the physicians are employees of the
HMO, the HMO will usually be held liable under the traditional theory of respondeat superior.
DiCicco, supra note 3, at 504. This theory of liability is not available in the case of an IPA model
HMO. Usually, IPA model HMO physicians see HMO patients in their own offices, use their
own equipment. and maintain their own private practice in addition to their contract with the
HMO. Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of II1., 703 N.E.2d 502, 508 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) [hereinafter
Jones I]. This is the most common form of HMO today. Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care
Organizations and Patient Injur,: Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REV. 419, 433 (1997).
109. Jones 1. 703 N.E.2d at 504.
110. Jones I, 730 N.E.2d at 1124. Jones' deposition revealed that she became a subscriber to
Chicago HMO after a representative of the HMO visited her home, assuring her that Chicago
HMO could provide her with health care benefits that were "better than a regular medical card."
Id.
11l. Id. Jones did not choose Dr. Jordan as her primary care physician. Id. Rather, Chicago
HMO assigned her to his care. Id.
112. Id. at 1125. According to Chicago HMO's medical director, federal regulations limit
HMO pediatricians to 3,500 patients. Jones 1, 703 N.E.2d at 506. At Dr. Jordan's deposition, he
estimated that he was assigned only 3.000 Chicago HMO patients as well as 1,500 patients
through other HMOs. Jones I, 730 N.E.2d at 1125. However, Chicago HMO's records listed
him as the primary care physician for 4,527 Chicago HMO patients as of December 1, 1990. Id.
In addition, Dr. Jordan maintained his own private practice of non-HMO patients. Id.
113. Jones I1 730 N.E.2d at 1123. Chicago HMO's "Member Handbook" instructed that
subscribers in need of care should "jcjall your Chicago HMO doctor first when you experience
an emergency or begin to feel sick." Id. at 1125 (emphasis in original).
114. Id. at 1123.
115. Id.
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advice. 116  The following day, when Shawndale's condition did not
improve, Ms. Jones took her daughter to the emergency room.117 The
emergency room doctor diagnosed Shawndale with bacterial
meningitis-a permanently disabling illness.118
Ms. Jones filed suit.1 19 Her complaint charged Chicago HMO with
institutional negligence, alleging that Chicago HMO negligently
assigned Dr. Jordan as the Jones' primary care physician when he had
an exorbitant number of patients. 120  In addition, Ms. Jones alleged that
Chicago HMO had negligently adopted procedures requiring a
subscriber to call the doctor in advance for an appointment, before
visiting the doctor's office. 12 1  The circuit court granted summary
judgment in favor of Chicago HMO, rejecting Jones' assertion that
Chicago HMO was subject to corporate negligence. 122  Jones
appealed. 123
B. Jones v. Chicago HMO: The Court Opinions
1. The Lower Court's Opinion
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the
circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on
116. Id. A medical expert for Jones stated in an affidavit and deposition testimony that Dr.
Jordan deviated from the standard of care when he was informed of Shawndale's symptoms, and
failed to schedule an immediate appointment. Id.
117. Id. Chicago HMO did authorize Shawndale's admission into the emergency room on
January 19. Id.
118. Id. Today, Shawndale is nine-years-old, weighs just forty-five pounds, and is unable to
feed herself. See Japsen, supra note 22, at 1.
119. Jones II, 730 N.E.2d at 1123. This suit was filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County.
Id.
120. Id. Jordan had over 4,500 patients at the time that he was treating Shawndale. See supra
note 112 (revealing that Chicago HMO records listed Dr. Jordan as the primary care physician for
4,527 Chicago HMO patients as of December 1, 1990).
121. Jones 11, 730 N.E.2d at 1123-24. Jones' complaint also charged Chicago HMO with
vicarious liability for the medical malpractice of Dr. Jordan and breach of contract. Jones 1, 703
N.E.2d at 504. The Circuit Court of Cook County granted summary judgment in favor the
Chicago HMO on both issues. Id. Subsequently, the Illinois Appellate Court and Supreme Court
both affirmed the Circuit Court's ruling on the breach of contract issue, holding that Jones' claim
is based on the contract between Chicago HMO and the Illinois Department of Public Aid, a
contract to which Jones herself was not a party. Jones 11, 730 N.E.2d at 1123.
The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the Circuit Court's decision regarding the vicarious
liability issue, affirming its own decision in Petrovich (which had not yet been decided by the
Illinois Supreme Court), and held that Chicago HMO could be subject to a claim of vicarious
liability for medical malpractice. Wurl, supra note 17, at 4-5. This issue was not raised again in
Jones 11. Jones 1I, 730 N.E.2d at 1123.
122. Jones 1, 703 N.E.2d at 504.
123. Id. at 507. Jones appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District. Id.
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the issue of institutional negligence.' 24  Relying heavily on Illinois
precedent, the court found no facts in the record of a negligent act that
warranted the application of corporate or institutional negligence
liability to an HMO that merely contracts with physicians to provide
health care to its subscribers. 125  Instead, the court stated that Illinois
precedent indicated that HMOs could be subjected to tort claims in
limited instances, but only after a plaintiff has asserted a recognized
legal theory of liability. 126  Although the court conceded that the
Petrovich and R aglin decisions made reference to the potential for
HMO liability under a theory of corporate negligence, no Illinois case
had affirmatively recognized this as a viable cause of action.' 27
In explaining its holding, the court focused on the independent
relationships between the HMO and Dr. Jordan. 128  Although the
opinion made no reference to Darling,129 the court did compare HMOs
to hospitals in terms of liability. 130 According to the court, a hospital
owes its patients an independent duty to review and supervise medical
treatment, but Illinois courts have never recognized any duty or
"corporate responsibility" of an HMO to oversee the quality of health
care that a contracting physician, independent of the HMO, provides in
124. Id. at 509, 511. This was a case of first impression for the Illinois Appellate Court. Ted
Gianaris, Jr., Survey of Illinois Law: Tort, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1253, 1258 (1999).
125. Jones 1, 703 N.E.2d at 508-09. The appellate court relied primarily on Petrovich and
Raglin, two recent cases addressing the issue of liability of HMOs. Id.; see also supra Part II.A.2
(discussing development of Illinois caselaw). The court did note that Pennsylvania courts have
recognized institutional negligence as a valid theory of liability. Jones 1, 703 N.E.2d at 509. In
addition, the court noted that in Illinois a hospital owes its patients an independent institutional
duty, "administrative and managerial in nature, to review and supervise medical treatment." Id.
However, the court stated that under Illinois law this corporate duty has not been extended to
create HMO liability "on facts similar to those developed in this case." Id.
126. Jones 1, 703 N.E.2d at 504. The court stated that: "Raglin and Petrovich stand for the
proposition that while HMOs are not immune from civil prosecution for malpractice, some
recognized legal theory must be satisfied before liability can be attached." Id.
127. Id. at 508. The courts in Raglin and Petrovich both observed the possibility that HMOs
may be liable for medical malpractice under more than one of the following theories of liability:
"(1) vicarious liability on the basis of respondeat superior or ostensible agency; (2) corporate
negligence based on the negligent selection and negligent control of the physician; and (3)
corporate negligence based upon the corporation's independent acts of negligence, e.g., in the
management of utilization control systems." Id. at 504 (quoting Raglin v. HMO Ill., Inc., 595
N.E.2d 153, 156 (Il1. App. Ct. 1992)).
128. Id. at 509. For example, Dr. Jordan's office was at a separate location, completely
independent of Chicago HMO. Id. In addition, Dr. Jordan wore no Chicago HMO identification
and his office contained no Chicago HMO insignia. Id. at 506.
129. See supra notes 37-55 and accompanying text (discussing Darling and its holding that
hospitals were subject to an administrative or managerial duty and therefore, they could be held
liable for institutional or corporate negligence).
130. Jones 1, 703 N.E.2d at 509.
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his private office. 131  The court stated that the Jones' injuries were
entirely divorced from any Chicago HMO policy or instruction and
related only to the conduct of Dr. Jordan. 132 Accordingly, the court held
that Chicago HMO was not guilty of any tortious act resulting in
Shawndale's injuries. 133
In its conclusion, the court noted the number of legislative attempts at
reform in this area.1 34 The court recognized that this was a delicate area
of the law and one that had been the subject of recent legislative
debates. 135 The court stated that based on the significance of the issue
and the considerations of public interest at stake, it was not the
appropriate forum for resolution.
136
2. The Illinois Supreme Court's Opinion
a. The Majority Opinion
In an opinion written by Justice Michael Bilandic, the Illinois
Supreme Court overturned the decision of the appellate court regarding
the liability of Chicago HMO for institutional negligence.137  The
court's decision was two-fold. First, it held for the first time that an
HMO could, in fact, be held liable for institutional negligence.
138
Second, in analyzing the facts of the case, the court held that there was
131. Id.
132. Id. at 508.
133. Id. at 509. The court stated:
We have reviewed the record for evidence that Chicago HMO was guilty of a negligent
act that proximately caused the injury in this case. We find none. Speculation cannot
take the place of fact. We have found no reported case anywhere that creates HMO
liability on facts similar to those developed in this case.
Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. The court stated:
We have been especially cautious when treading through this new ground. While we
believe that there may be circumstances that establish the independent corporate
negligence of an HMO, we also understand this area is fraught with considerations of
public interest, matters that courts are ill-equipped to determine. We note that two bills
on managed care reform were considered, but not acted upon by our legislature in
1998.... We presume the matter will again be addressed.
Id. (citing Managed Care Reform Act, S.B. 1904, 90th Leg., 1998 Sess. (I11.); H.B. 974, 90th
Leg., 1998 Sess. (Ill.)).
137. Jones 11, 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1135 (Ill. 2000). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the
appellate court's decision regarding Jones' breach of contract claim. Id. Jones also included in
her appeal a breach of warranty claim against Chicago HMO. Id. The court held, however, that
Jones had waived any breach of warranty claim by failing to raise it in the courts below. Id.
138. Id.
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sufficient evidence of such negligence to withstand Chicago HMO's
motion for summary judgment.'39 Accordingly, the lower court's
decision granting Chicago HMO's motion for summary judgment was
reversed. 140
In analyzing whether a patient could sue an HMO for institutional
negligence, the court relied heavily on its own precedent in Darling,14 1
where institutional negligence was applied to hospitals. 142 The court
examined the Darling decision and its rationale and drew a persuasive
analogy between hospitals and HMOs as health care providers. 1
43
Darling recognized that hospitals have an independent duty to assume
responsibility for the care of its patients. 144 The standard of care
required is the care of a "reasonably careful hospital" under similar
circumstances. 145 The liability imposed in Darling was based on the
negligence of the hospital alone, not that of any physician. 146  This
liability was appropriate in Darling because the role of a hospital in
providing health care had expanded considerably over the years. Such
expanded responsibility for care required the hospital to assume greater
legal responsibilities for its corporate activities. 147 The staff employed
to fulfill this role is made up of administrative and manual workers, in
addition to medical staff. 148 Thus, a hospital is subject to institutional
liability for any negligence beyond that of the employed physicians. 149
Having thus elaborated on the Darling rationale, the Jones court
concluded that HMOs, like hospitals, assume an "expanded role" in
providing health care. 150 More importantly, the court stated that the
corporate responsibilities of an HMO are essential to fulfilling their
expanded role. 15 1 The group of individuals who, through their various
duties, collectively provide comprehensive health care services to HMO
139. Id. at 1134.
140. Id. at 1135.
141. Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965).
142. Jones 11, 730 N.E.2d at 1128-32.
143. Id. Conversely, the appellate court decision made no reference to the Darling decision.
See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text (discussing the appellate court's reference to
hospital liability without specifically mentioning Darling).
144. Jones 11, 730 N.E.2d at 1128.
145. Id. (quoting Advincula v. United Blood Serv., 678 N.E.2d 1009 (I11. 1996)).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. id. at 1128-29.
151. Id. at 1128.
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subscribers extends far beyond merely medical staff.152  Therefore, as
an institution, HMOs assume a legal duty to conform to a standard of
reasonable conduct. 153 The court also noted that the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania recently addressed this issue. In Shannon v. McNulty,
154
the Pennsylvania court recognized the institutional liability of HMOs
and also relied heavily on an analogy to hospitals. 155  Thus, quoting
Shannon as the only available authority on this issue, the court
concluded that, in Illinois, institutional negligence is, in fact, a basis for
a valid claim against HMOs. 156
The court then assessed whether, under a theory of institutional
negligence, Chicago HMO was entitled to summary judgment. 157  The
court addressed both of Jones' claims: first, that Chicago HMO had
negligently assigned too many patients to Dr. Jordan; 158 and second,
that the HMO had negligently adopted procedures requiring patients to
call for an appointment before visiting the doctor's office. 159 As to the
152. Id. The court referred to an HMO as an "amalgam of many individuals who play various
roles in order to provide comprehensive health care services to their members." Id. (citing
Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828, 835-36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)).
153. Id. at 1129.
154. Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
155. Jones 11, 730 N.E.2d at 1128 (citing Shannon, 718 A.2d at 835-36). In Shannon, the
plaintiff patient sued her HMO for corporate liability "stemming from the premature delivery and
subsequent death of [her] son." Shannon, 718 A.2d at 829. The defendant HMO,
HealthAmerica, provided an emergency care phone service staffed by triage nurses. Id. at 836.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that "HMOs may, under the right circumstances, be held
corporately liable." Id.
156. Jones H, 730 N.E.2d at 1128.
157. Id. at 1128-29. At this point in the opinion, Justice Bilandic reiterated the basis for
institutional negligence. Id. at 1132-35. He stated, "[p]arenthetically, we note that this assertion
involves an administrative or managerial action by Chicago HMO, not the professional conduct
of its physicians." Id. at 1132.
158. Id. at 1132-34.
159. Id. at 1135. In addition, the parties were in dispute over the evidence Jones was required
to present in support of her negligence claims against the HMO. Id. at 1129. Specifically,
Chicago HMO argued that Jones could not proceed on her claim without putting forth expert
testimony as to the appropriate standard of care required of an HMO. Id. The court thoroughly
examined this issue, comparing this case to those of both ordinary negligence and professional
negligence. Id. at 1129-32. The standard of care in a case of ordinary negligence is that of a
"reasonably prudent person" and this requires only lay testimony-expert testimony is
unnecessary. Id. at 1130. Conversely, the standard of care in the case of professional negligence
requires expert testimony to establish both the standard of care expected of the professional and
the professional's deviation from that standard. Id. The difference between the two is that, in the
case of professional negligence, a lay juror is thought to be unfamiliar with the profession and
therefore, "not equipped to determine what constitutes reasonable care in professional conduct
without the help of expert testimony." Id. Applying this analysis to proof of the standard of care
of an HMO the court again relied on the holding in the Darling case. Id. at 1131. The
institutional negligence of a hospital can be proven without the use of expert testimony. Id.
Instead, hospital bylaws, licensing regulations and standards for hospital accreditation were
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latter claim, the court quickly disposed of Jones' argument and held that
Chicago HMO was entitled to summary judgment because Jones failed
to set forth sufficient evidence of the standard of care required of an
HMO in developing appointment procedures. 160
The court, however, agreed with Jones as to the claim against
Chicago HMO for Dr. Jordan's extraordinary patient-load. 16 1 The court
relied on the testimony of Chicago HMO's own medical director as
"proper and sufficient evidence" of the requisite standard of care. 162
The HMO's medical director had stated that an HMO should not assign
more than 3,500 patients to a single physician. 163 The evidence
revealed that Dr. Jordan had more than 6,000 patients. 164 Because
Chicago HMO assigned Jones to Dr. Jordan instead of allowing her to
choose her primary care physician, the court held that Dr. Jordan's
patient overload was enough evidence to support a claim of institutional
negligence against the HMO. 165
The court further noted that other evidence in the record supported
Jones' claim of institutional negligence against Chicago HMO.166 For
example, Chicago HMO was soliciting new subscribers by sending
representatives door to door when it did not have a sufficient number of
sufficient to establish the standard of care of a hospital. Id. Because the same rule should apply
to HMOs, similar evidentiary sources, not necessarily expert testimony, are capable of proving
the standard of care required of an HMO. Id. at 1131-32.
160. Id. at 1135.
161. Id. at 1134.
162. Id. at 1132. The court stated, "[t]his particular standard of care evidence, setting forth a
limit of 3,500 patients per primary care physician, is adequate to equip a lay juror to determine
what constitutes the standard of care required of a 'reasonably careful HMO' under the
circumstances of this case." Id. The court relied on Darling, holding that a hospital's own
bylaws could establish the standard of care, to come to this determination. Id.
163. Id. The number "3,500" was based on federal guidelines. Id. Chicago HMO's medical
director, Dr. Trubitt, had even stated that "if Dr. Jordan himself had 6,000 or more patients, then
that would be an unusually large number and of concern to Chicago HMO." Id.
164. Id.; see also supra note 112 (discussing the number of patients that Dr. Jordan had under
his care at the time he was treating the Jones family). The court relied on Chicago HMO's own
reports listing Dr. Jordan as the primary care physician of 4,527 Chicago HMO subscribers,
which alone constitutes a patient load in excess of the number determined to be the standard of
care. See Jones H, 730 N.E.2d at 1132. In addition, Dr. Jordan estimated that he was assigned
another 1,500 patients through other HMOs, and he also maintained a private practice. Id.
Chicago HMO argued that these numbers were excusable because Dr. Jordan had testified that he
employed four part-time physicians to work in his office. Id. at 1132-33. On a motion for
summary judgment, however, the court had to dismiss this argument since there was no record as
to the capacity of these part-time employees and their relationship with the Chicago HMO
subscribers who were treated by Dr. Jordan. Id. at 1133.
165. Id. at 1134. HMOs have been repeatedly criticized for limiting a patient's choice of
doctors and hospitals. Japsen, supra note 22, at 3.
166. Jones 11, 730 N.E.2d at 1133-34.
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physicians to serve the needs of so many patients. 167 Furthermore, the
contract between Chicago HMO and the Department of Public Aid
required that Chicago HMO have one full time physician for every
2,000 subscribers. 168 Chicago HMO argued that there was no evidence
of any causal connection between a patient overload and the injuries
Shawndale suffered. 169 However, the court noted that this was a
reasonable issue for the trier of fact to decide. 170
The court also addressed the policy concerns pervading the issue of
HMO liability.' 71  Chicago HMO argued that only individual
physicians, not HMOs, have a duty to determine the number of patients
any one physician can handle. 172 The court held, however, that because
the role of an HMO is to provide medical care, it would offend public
policy to allow an HMO to assign an excessive number of patients to a
single physician without holding the HMO accountable for any injuries
that result.173  Holding HMOs accountable serves to counteract the
excessive need for profits. 174
In the end, both public policy considerations and overwhelming
evidence supported Jones' theory of Chicago HMO's institutional
negligence in assigning Dr. Jordan too many patients.1 75 Accordingly,
the court concluded that "Chicago HMO [was] not entitled to summary
167. Id. at 1133. Jones testified that she initially became a subscriber when a Chicago HMO
representative "visited her home and persuaded her to become a member." Id.
168. Id. at 1134. The contract stated, "[tihere shall be at least one full-time equivalent, board
eligible physician to every 1,200 enrollees, including one full-time equivalent, board certified
primary care physician for each 2,000 enrollees. There shall be one pediatrician for each 2,000
enrollees under age 17." Id. at 1126.
169. Id. at 1133.
170. Id. The court stated, "[a] lay juror can discern that a physician who has thousands more
patients than he should will not have time to service them all in an appropriate manner." Id.
Because questions of fact remained, the majority held that the lower court's grant of summary
judgment must be reversed. Id. at 1134.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. The court stated:
Finally, the remaining factors favor placing this burden on HMOs as well. Public
policy would not be well served by allowing HMOs to assign an excessive number of
patients to a primary care physician and then 'wash their hands' of the matter. The
central consequence of placing this burden on HMOs is HMO accountability for their
own actions. This court in Petrovich recognized that HMO accountability is needed to
counterbalance the HMO goal of cost containment and, where applicable, the inherent
drive of an HMO to achieve profits.
Id. (citing Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756, 764 (Ill. 1999)).
174. Id.
175. Id.
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judgment on Jones' claim of institutional negligence for assigning too
many patients to Dr. Jordan."' 176
b. The Dissents
Two justices disagreed with the majority's conclusion on the issue of
institutional negligence. 7 7 Justice Benjamin Miller and Justice S. Louis
Rathje both agreed that the court should affirm the lower court's grant
of summary judgment, but for different reasons. 178  Accordingly, the
two justices wrote separate dissenting opinions.
Justice Miller acknowledged that corporate or institutional negligence
is a recognized and valid theory of liability.179  Instead, he disagreed
that Ms. Jones set forth the requisite causal connection between the
excessive number of patients assigned to Dr. Jordan by Chicago HMO
and Jones' injuries. 180 Justice Miller opined that a "nexus" was required
in order for Jones' corporate negligence claim to succeed. 181  Justice
Miller further criticized the majority for relying on the statement by the
HMO's medical director that 6,000 patients would be a worrisome
patient load for one doctor, while ignoring the testimony of the medical
director that this number would not be so inordinate if the doctor's
office employed additional doctors and other personnel or increased its
hours of operation. 182  In sum, Justice Miller believed the majority
improperly inferred a connection between Chicago HMO's actions and
Shawndale Jones' injuries and therefore disagreed with their
conclusion. 183
Justice Rathje dissented on much broader grounds. Instead of
disagreeing on the issue of whether the facts supported the claim of
institutional negligence, Justice Rathje argued against extending
176. Id. The court's decision in favor of Jones bears "no verdict of innocence or guilt."
Japsen, supra note 22, at 2.
177. Jones I1, 730 N.E.2d at 1136-39 (Miller, J., and Rathje, J., dissenting). Although both
justices disagreed on the issue of institutional negligence, they concurred with the majority on the
issues of breach of warranty and breach of contract. Id. (Miller, J., and Rathje, J., dissenting).
178. Id. (Miller J., and Rathje, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 1136 (Miller, I., dissenting).
180. Id. (Miller, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Miller, J., dissenting). Justice Miller quotes the trial court opinion as saying,
"[Plaintiff's counsel] comes up with some theories. He comes up with some numbers.., there's
no nexus. There's no expert testimony to show how these claimed theories and numbers,
omissions, or failures, had any impact on the doctor's decisions in this case." Id. (Miller, J.,
dissenting). Justice Miller cites the appellate court as recognizing the same flaw in the Jones
case. id. (Miller, J., dissenting) (citing Jones 1, 703 N.E.2d 502, 508 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)).
182. Id. (Miller, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 1136-37 (Miller, J., dissenting).
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institutional negligence to managed care organizations like Chicago
HMO. 184 Specifically, he argued that the majority's analogy between
hospitals and HMOs was misplaced and, thus, an HMO should not be
subjected to the same theories of liability as a hospital.'85 An HMO,
such as Chicago HMO, is simply a "vehicle" through which subscribers
are assigned a primary care physician and pay their bills.' 86 In contrast,
he argued, a hospital plays a much more significant role in the actual
decision making and medical care of its patients, including physically
administering or supervising the medical care and aiding its patients in
decision making regarding their care. 187  The difference, according to
Justice Rathje, between an HMO's role and that of a hospital is so
fundamental that subjecting the two to the same theories of liability is
inappropriate. 188
Justice Rathje also recognized crucial differences among various
HMO models and addressed the majority's reliance on the Pennsylvania
case, Shannon v. McNulty. 189 Like a hospital, the HMO at issue in
Shannon was much more involved in the actual medical care that its
patients were provided; it was not merely a "vehicle" for paying
medical bills. 190 The HMO in Shannon employed nurses to advise
subscribers on important medical decisions. 191 Justice Rathje argued
that this type of HMO was very different from Chicago HMO, which
simply contracted with physicians. 192 He explained that this difference
was even recognized by the Shannon court as paramount in its analysis
and extension of liability.193 According to Justice Rathje, the majority
184. Id. at 1137 (Rathje, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 1137-38 (Rathje, J., dissenting). Justice Rathje stated, "[a]lthough both a hospital
and an HMO hire many different people for many different reasons, the reasons for holding
hospitals liable under this theory do not hold true for Chicago HMO." Id. at 1137 (Rathje, J.,
dissenting).
186. Id. at 1138 (Rathje, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (Rathje, J., dissenting).
188. Id. (Rathje, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 1137-39 (Rathje, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 1137 (Rathje, J., dissenting).
191. Id. (Rathje, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 1138 (Rathje, J., dissenting).
193. Id. (Rathje, J., dissenting). Justice Rathje quotes the Shannon court as concluding:
Where the HMO is providing health care services rather than merely providing money
to pay for services their conduct should be subject to scrutiny. We see no reason why
the duties applicable to hospitals should not be equally applied to an HMO when that
HMO is performing the same or similar functions as a hospital. When a benefits
provider, be it an insurer or a managed care organization, interjects itself into the
rendering of medical decisions affecting a subscriber's care it must do so in a
medically reasonable manner. Here, HealthAmerica provided a phone service for
emergent care staffed by triage nurses. Hence, it was under a duty to oversee that the
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created a general rule regarding HMO liability while failing to take into
account fundamental structural differences that exist among various
HMOs.' 94 Therefore, Justice Rathje urged that the majority's reliance
on Shannon was misplaced. 195  Justice Rathje concluded that
institutional liability was inappropriate in the case of Chicago HMO.196
IV. ANALYSIS
In Jones v. Chicago HMO, the Illinois Supreme Court correctly
concluded that tort liability for corporate negligence applies to HMOs
just as it does to hospitals. Because of the expanded role that HMOs
have assumed in the area of health care and the number of people
relying on HMOs today, far-reaching tort liability must be extended into
this area of health care in order to ensure quality care. 197 Furthermore,
because an HMO inherently seeks to limit costs, it must be held to a
higher standard of care. HMO accountability is the most efficient way
to safeguard against placing profits ahead of proper medical
treatment. 
198
A. HMOs Assume the Same Role as Hospitals in Health Care Delivery
Since the Illinois Supreme Court decision in Darling, Illinois has
recognized institutional negligence as a theory of tort liability for
hospitals. 199 The Darling court recognized the administrative duty of
dispensing of advice by those nurses would be performed in a medically reasonable
manner. Accordingly ... HMOs may, under the right circumstances, be held
corporately liable.
Id. at 1137 (Rathje, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (quoting Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d
828, 835-36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
194. Id. at 1139 (Rathje, J., dissenting). Rathje recognized that Chicago HMO is an
independent practice association that contracts with individual physicians who are solo or group
practitioners. Id. (Rathje, J., dissenting). "[T]he way in which daily business is conducted, the
duties of nurses and other staff, and other day-to-day decisions are made by the individual doctor
or hospital with whom the HMO has contracted." Id. at 1138 (Rathje, J., dissenting).
Conversely, under a staff model HMO, where the providers are all salaried employees of the
HMO, the HMO presumably has much more control over these providers, and institutional
liability against the HMO is more appropriate. Id. at 1139 (Rathje, J., dissenting). "Having a
uniform standard of care for all HMOs makes little sense, given the major differences in
structure." Id. (Rathje, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 1138 (Rathje, J., dissenting).
196. Id. (Rathje, J., dissenting).
197. Anderson, supra note 7, at 337-38.
198. Jones II, 730 N.E.2d at 1134 (quoting Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 719
N.E.2d 756 (I11. 999)).
199. Id. at 1128 (stating, "[s]ince the landmark decision in Darling v. Charleston Community
Memorial Hospital, Illinois has recognized that hospitals may be held liable for institutional
negligence.., an independent duty of hospitals to assume responsibility for the care of their
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hospitals, due to the expanded role of hospitals in the medical care of
their patients.200 Hospitals no longer merely provide a setting for the
medical treatment to take place. Rather, they are an active participant in
the actual administration of medical treatment. 20 1 As such, hospitals are
held to a standard of care that incorporates administrative or managerial
duties.202
HMOs have taken over today's health care industry. 20 3 A very large
number of Americans now rely on an HMO for their health care. 204
Like hospitals, HMOs no longer play a passive role in providing health
care to their subscribers. 20 5 Their policies and regulations directly
impact the health care that is provided.20 6 HMOs, as an entity, provide
comprehensive health care services to their subscribers. 20 7
In accordance with this new role, HMOs have a duty to supervise the
administration of health care to their subscribers and maintain policies
that provide for the best possible care. 20 8 Corporate liability imposes on
HMOs certain non-delegable duties to ensure that subscribers receive
this quality care and are protected from any foreseeable harm. 20  With
patients" (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)).
200. Id. (citing Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (I11. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966)).
201. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 257. In Darling, the court stated:
Present-day hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more
than furnish facilities for treatment. They regularly employ on a salary basis a large
staff of physicians, nurses and interns, as well as administrative and manual workers,
and they charge patients for medical care and treatment, collecting for such, if
necessary, by legal action.
Id.
202. See id.
203. Supra Part I (discussing the transformation of the health care industry in America and the
growing number of HMOs and HMO subscribers); see also Todd Ebersole, Emerging Theories of
HMO Liability for Negligence of Its Network Providers, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Dec. 1999, at
30 (stating, "HMOs have become the dominant organization in our nation's health care delivery
system").
204. Spielberg, supra note 19, at 54 (stating that more and more people are receiving their
health care through HMOs).
205. Linda Peeno, Managed Care and the Corporate Practice of Medicine, TRIAL, Feb. 2000,
at 18-20 (stating that HMOs have the "last word in determinations of medical necessity").
206. Id. (asserting that HMOs are making medical decisions).
207. Jones H, 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1124 (I11. 2000).
208. Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828, 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (stating that, like a
hospital, an HMO has a duty "to oversee all persons who practice medicine within its walls as to
patient care").
209. Bartimus & Wright, supra note 5, at 767. The two most "paramount" duties under the
doctrine of corporate negligence for HMOs are:
(1) to ensure that all treating physicians who are endorsed by, are employed by or are
agents of the HMO are properly qualified to render health care to HMO subscribers;
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so many subscribers depending on the managed care system, HMOs
should assume a responsibility to the subscribers to maintain a certain
standard of care in the administration of these duties. 210 In the event
that an HMO fails to meet this standard, a subscriber should have a right
to sue under a theory of corporate negligence.
211
B. HMOs' Cost-Containment Aim Mandates Increased Tort Liability
HMOs must be subject to the threat of tort liability in order to
counteract the "cost-containment philosophy" of managed care.212 The
organization of an HMO inherently creates a motivation to provide the
subscriber with a minimal amount of health care.213 Most HMOs,
including Chicago HMO, provide their physicians with compensation
under a "capitation method. ' 214  Under this system, doctors are not
compensated according to the services they provide. 215  Instead, for
each patient the HMO assigns to a physician, the HMO pays the
physician a monthly fixed fee, regardless of whether that physician has
actually seen or treated the patient that month.216 This system of
compensation provides the HMO's physicians with an incentive not to
treat the patient.217 In addition, HMOs create additional incentives for
physicians by setting up bonus arrangements whereby physicians
receive increased compensation if they reduce their use of ancillary
and (2) to establish a process by which an HMO may thoughtfully determine whether
treatment requested by a primary care physician is medically necessary, thereby
allowing patients to receive beneficial health care that will not compromise their well-
being in exchange for trying to save the HMO money.
Id.
210. Id. at 765 (arguing that although traditionally corporate negligence has been applied
primarily to hospitals, HMOs should be subject to this theory of liability as well).
211. Id. (stating that as they are "gaining increased popularity as a source of health care
delivery, HMOs are no longer untouchable when it comes to court imposed liability for failing to
meet the obligations imposed under the corporate negligence doctrine").
212. Noah, supra note 2, at 1225 (referring to the cost-containment philosophy of managed
care, which causes an HMO to restrict how and where patients can seek medical treatment).
213. Id. at 1225-27.
214. Anderson, supra note 7, at 326-27 (describing the capitation method of payment for
doctors that have contracted with HMOs); see also Jones 11, 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1127 (I11. 2000)
(describing the contractual agreement between Chicago HMO and Dr. Jordan for compensation).
215. Anderson, supra note 7, at 326.
216. See Jones II, 730 N.E.2d at 1127. For example, under Dr. Jordan's contract with
Chicago HMO, for every female patient under two years old (like Shawndale Jones), Dr. Jordan
would receive $39.14 per month, regardless of whether he actually treated that child. Id.
217. Anderson, supra note 7, at 327 (arguing that "[u]nder this system, doctors have a
financial incentive to do less rather than more for patients because HMOs do not provide extra
compensation for additional procedures"). This system provides doctors with a financial
incentive not to order tests or even see the patient because they are getting paid the fixed rate
regardless. Id.
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services, such as diagnostic tests, referrals, and experimental
treatments. 218  This clearly creates a disincentive to administer proper
tests or to make referrals to other physicians. 219 Based on this system of
compensating physicians and its inherent dangers, HMOs should be
held to a corporate or administrative duty to supervise the quality of
care that physicians are providing to the HMO's subscribers. 220
Furthermore, HMOs should not be immune from liability because
they no longer merely "facilitate" the providing of health care from
physicians to HMO subscribers.2 2  Rather, the role of an HMO has
expanded, and HMOs actually provide health care. 222 The business and
practices of an HMO have a direct effect on the quality of health care
that is eventually received by the subscriber. 223 The medical decisions
are no longer left to the physicians because the HMOs place substantial
financial restraints on the physicians. 224  An entity that interjects itself
into medical decisions with effects on the health and treatment of its
subscribers should be held accountable for any injury that results from
those decisions. 225  With so much control over the medical treatment
218. See Herrington, supra note 1, at 719. Under these arrangements, the HMO sets up a pool
of funds to pay for any ancillary services prescribed by the physician. Id. Physicians who are
"frugal in their use" of these services receive the unspent funds. Id. Other arrangements provide
that an HMO "reduces a portion of the physician's capitated payment and uses the withheld
amount to fund a pool for ancillary services." Id. Again, any unspent portion of the fund will be
returned to the physician. Id.
219. Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 696 N.E.2d 356, 362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)
(stating, "Share's use of the capitation system could lead to the reasonable inference that Share's
method of compensation to its participating physicians created a disincentive to order tests or
make referrals and thus exerted control over its physicians' medical decisions").
220. Noah, supra note 2, at 1232 (stating that as courts begin to recognize the effects these
financial incentives have on the quality of health care, they are more willing to hold HMOs
accountable).
Despite these concerns about physician incentives, it should be noted that on June 12, 2000, the
United States Supreme Court held, in Pegram v. Herdrich, that under ERISA, which governs
employment benefits, patients cannot sue their HMOs for giving doctors financial incentives to
cut treatment costs. Pegran v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
221. Noah, supra note 2, at 1233.
222. Jones 11, 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1128 (I11. 2000) (stating, "HMOs, like hospitals, consist of an
amalgam of many individuals who play various roles in order to provide comprehensive health
care services to their members").
223. Id. (arguing that an HMO's "cost containing strategies have a direct influence on the
quality of health care").
224. Noah, supra note 2, at 1225 (stating that "HMOs seek to control the use of outside
facilities and specialists because the overuse of such services would pose a threat to the fiscal
stability of the HMO"); see also supra note 219 (quoting Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of
Illinois, Inc., stating that the capitation system of compensating physicians creates a "disincentive
to order tests or make referrals and thus, exert[s] control over its physicians' medical decisions").
225. Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828, 836 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (stating, "when a benefits
provider, be it an insurer or managed care organization, interjects itself into the rendering of
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that a patient subscriber receives, an HMO should no longer be shielded
from immunity.22
6
Corporate negligence as a theory of tort liability is especially
appropriate in the case of an HMO because it holds the HMO
accountable for its policies and organization, rather than its employees'
negligence. 227  A challenge to an HMO's policies will improve the
quality of health care provided in a more effective way than a medical
malpractice claim because it is a direct attack on the HMO's business
administration.2 28  The HMO will find it is more profitable to assure
that its subscribers receive proper and adequate care.
V. IMPACT
In the wake of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision, the actual
impact of the Jones case on the health care industry is uncertain. What
is certain is that legal remedies are now much more available to HMO
subscribers than they were in the past.229  Furthermore, the national
movement toward giving subscribers more rights and remedies does not
seem to be coming to a close and the Jones decision may only add to the
momentum.230  The vast right to sue will certainly increase HMO
accountability and responsibility. 231 HMOs will inevitably be held to a
higher standard of quality care which, in turn, will result in better
medical decisions affecting a subscriber's care, it must do so in a medically reasonable manner").
226. Anderson, supra note 7, at 338 (stating that "it is unfair to shield this enormous industry
from accountability to its customers").
227. Spielberg, supra note 19, at 54 (discussing the case of In re U.S. Healthcare, 193 F.3d
151 (3rd Cir. 1999), in which the plaintiffs sued the defendant HMO under a theory of corporate
negligence, challenging the policy of the HMO that limited its members to twenty-four hours of
hospitalization after delivery of a newborn).
228. Id. at 58 (stating, "these claims challenge policies that put profits first and health last").
229. Japsen, supra note 22, at 1. The decision in Jones 11, however, will only immediately
effect 2.4 million of the Illinois residents enrolled in HMOs. Id. The hundreds of thousands of
Illinois residents who are enrolled in self-insured plans through their employer will not be
affected because their plans are exempt from such litigation under ERISA. Id.
230. The United States Congress is still considering the Norwood-Dingell Bill, which would
expand patients' rights and include the right to sue. The recently elected 107th Congress is
considered likely to have enough support for the bill to finally pass both houses. Melanie
Eversley, Patients' Bill of Rights Looks Poised for Passage: Tight Congress Boosts Prospects,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 18, 2000, at 6, available at 2000 WL 5487249. In addition, a
subscriber's right to sue their HMO was a key issue in the 2000 presidential and congressional
elections. Jim Ritter, Opponents Differ on Patients' Right to Sue Care Plans, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Oct. 2, 2000, at 7, available at 2000 WL 6697635 (noting that George W. Bush opposes granting
HMO subscribers the right to sue, while Al Gore is in favor of providing subscribers this right).
231. Jones 11, 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1134 (I11. 2000) (stating that "[t]he central consequence of
placing this burden on HMOs is HMO accountability for their own actions").
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medical treatment for HMO subscribers. 232  However, these legal
ramifications may bring an increase in the costs of HMOs as well as an
increase in the number of lawsuits. 233  Nonetheless, HMO
accountability and an improvement in the quality of health care
provided will overshadow any unfavorable consequences that
accompany this vast right to sue.
234
A. HMO Accountability for Inadequate Care
Subjecting HMOs to legal ramifications, as in Jones, will
undoubtedly improve the quality of care provided to HMO
subscribers. 235  In fact, the court in Jones relied on this result in its
rationale in support of its holding. 236 Expanding the subscribers' right
to sue has an immediate deterrent effect on an HMO.237 In an effort to
avoid litigation and limit their liability, HMOs will increase the number
of services provided to its subscribers. 238 In addition, HMOs will make
quality health care a priority, and HMO accountability will
counterbalance the urge to sacrifice quality in favor of profit-making.
239
Accordingly, the impact Jones will have on the quality of the health
care an HMO subscriber receives is substantial.
B. Increase in Health Care Costs and Frivolous Lawsuits
Opponents of the Jones decision argue that subjecting HMOs to such
liability will lead to an increase in the cost of health care. 240 By
232. Id.
233. Infra Part V.B (discussing potential for increase in health care costs and litigation).
234. Geyelin, supra note 9, at 1. Advocates of the "patients' bill of rights" believe that even if
the costs increase, the changes in the law will be worth it. Id. One attorney who specializes in
representing patients suing HMOs stated: "The American public would be willing to pay a few
dollars more to have the assurance that managed-care companies will be sued if they provide care
that costs their loved ones their lives." id.
235. Jones 1I, 730 N.E.2d at 1134.
236. Supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text (quoting Jones II and its discussion of HMO
accountability as a reason for deciding in favor of Jones). This was also a factor for the Petrovich
court. Supra note 83 and accompanying text (quoting Petrovich on the issue of HMO
accountability).
237. Corboy, supra note 9, at 22; see also infra notes 245-49 and accompanying text
(discussing the obvious deterrent effect the right to sue has had in other states as evidenced by the
minimal number of lawsuits since the enactment of the law granting subscribers the right).
238. Japsen, supra note 22, at 1.
239. Jones 11, 730 N.E.2d at 1134 (referring to the "inherent drive of an HMO to achieve
profit").
240. Holt, supra note 10, at 1 (noting that Republican leaders in the Illinois General Assembly
who opposed legislation granting this right to sue argued that it would increase health care costs
and make health insurance available to fewer people). Costs have been predicted to increase up
to ten to twelve percent within a year. Paul Swiech, Businesses' Health Costs Forecast to Rise
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allowing patients the right to sue, HMOs will be forced to increase the
cost of enrollment in the HMO to cover the costs of potential
lawsuits. 241  In addition, HMOs will increase costs to provide their
subscribers with better and more services, in order to limit their
liability. 242  The increase in costs is an inevitable, but necessary,
consequence of this essential expansion in the rights of HMO
subscribers.
Opponents also argue that improving legal ramifications will result in
frivolous lawsuits flooding an already over-burdened judicial system.243
While it is still too soon after the Jones decision to determine the impact
on litigation in Illinois, a review of the results in other states that have
granted HMO subscribers the right to sue may provide guidance on this
issue. 244  In Texas, a statute providing subscribers the right to sue for
medical malpractice was enacted in 1997.245 In the two years following
this enactment, there were five lawsuits against HMOs in Texas
courts. 2 4 6  In Missouri, the state legislature also granted HMO
Legislation, Costs Upping Expense of Workers Insurance, THE PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, I11.),
Nov. 13, 1999, at D7, available at 1999 WL 16671500 (discussing the potential financial
implications for any legislation granting patients the right to sue).
241. Japsen, supra note 22, at 3 (quoting a local consultant who stated, "if a health plan is on
the losing end of a lawsuit, they are going to seek financial recovery by raising rates").
242. Id. It should be noted that in the three years since Texas enacted legislation granting
HMO subscribers the right to sue, the premiums have increased only minimally. Rosalyn
Bonanti, Tort 'Reform' in the States, TRIAL, Aug. 2000, at 32.
243. Corboy, supra note 9, at 22. The rising concerns surrounding the quality of health care
provided by HMOs has resulted in a considerable amount of litigation, ranging from class actions
alleging negligent care, to claims under federal anti-racketeering laws, alleging the use of cost-
limited standards to deny coverage. Denniston, supra note 6, at 3A.
244. A recent case before the Illinois Supreme Court did consider the financial incentives that
an HMO uses to contain costs for tests and referrals. Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 497 (I11.
2000). However, HMO accountability and liability was not at issue in this case. Instead, the case
addressed only a doctor's liability for his relationship with the patient's HMO and whether a
doctor is responsible for failing to disclose the HMO's financial incentives to the patient. Id. The
Illinois Supreme Court held that the patient may not bring both a medical negligence claim and a
breach of fiduciary claim against a doctor. Id. at 10. Chicago HMO was the HMO at issue in this
case, although the HMO was not a party. Id. at 1.
245. Amy Goldstein, 'Patients' Rights' Case Study: So Far, Benign; In Texas, Ability to Sue
HMOs Has Prompted Little Litigation, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1999, at Al.
246. Id. (urging that the Congress should enact a statute similar to that of Texas). There are 4
million Texans who belong to HMOs. Id. A Texas state senator who had supported the right to
sue legislation stated, "[t]he sky didn't fall," noting that the "horror stories" predicted by the
managed care industry never materialized. Id.
In addition, the Texas statute provided for an external review board for subscribers' complaints
regarding HMO decisions for medical treatment. Id. The Texas Department of Insurance had
predicted 4,400 complaints in the first year. Id. Instead, only 531 complaints were registered
with the board. Id. Forty-six percent of these complaints were decided in favor of the HMO
subscriber. Id.
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subscribers the right to sue their HMO.24 7 In the first year following
this enactment there were no liability suits against HMOs. 248 These low
numbers indicate that the potential for legal ramifications has a deterrent
effect on HMOs, increasing the quality of health care provided and
reducing the need for lawsuits.
249
VI. CONCLUSION
The Illinois Supreme Court correctly concluded that the theory of
corporate negligence applies to HMOs. HMO patients and subscribers
should have a right to legal remedies for injuries that result from the
policies and procedures of their HMO. The medical treatment that a
subscriber receives is too important to preclude such remedies. HMOs
have assumed great responsibility for the care that its subscribers
receive, and, therefore, they must assume consummate legal liability. In
conclusion, the right to sue will result in more responsible corporate
management on issues dealing with patients' care, which in turn will
result in better care.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. (stating "[tihe experience in Texas and Missouri suggests that the deterrent effect of
legal accountability has encouraged managed-care insurers to provide better patient care").
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